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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 281 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 25/11/1991 
Where it occurred: not made available Country: Kuwait 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: KMOD 37/SER 27 Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K5 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Pt Mi Baa 111 AT blast Ground condition: sandy 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The 
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made 
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in 
Kuwait at the time of the accident. 
The victim had arrived in Kuwait on 17th June 1991, so had been working there for five 
months. 
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The demining group were a commercial company with a time penalty on their work. 
International staff were paid very well. The group worked in three-man teams with a two-man 
drill. They used the Schiebel AN-19 detector. 
An experienced ex-pat deminer was working on manual clearance of PTMIBA-III AT mines. 
The mines were surface laid and in a regular pattern. He had disarmed several that morning 
and had changed with his No2. He returned after a rest break and approached the next mine 
in the row. He was witnessed approaching the mine, bending down and it is believed he had a 
tool in his hand. He reached the mine and his partner reported that he was brushing the sand 
from the top of the mine when it detonated.   
The victim was “torn limb from limb” and died instantly. His PPE was either “not penetrated” or 
“disintegrated” depending on the source. 
The team managers had been informed at a daily meeting a few days before that according to 
the plan of operations it was expected that the group would soon reach an area containing 
these mine. The Pt Mi Ba 111 was officially designated as a ‘NO TOUCH” mine which should 
be prepared for disposal in situ. This was because information suggested that the mines were 
detonating spontaneously due to fuze failure as a result of age, temperature etc. Several had 
apparently detonated spontaneously at night. 
Unfortunately, either the Team Leader had not been passed this information by the team 
Manager, or had decided to over-rule it. It is possible that the information was simply not 
passed on in time because the deminers worked more quickly than expected. Whatever the 
reason, a failure of communication in the management chain meant that the victim was 
working in a manner that was known to be unsafe at the time of the accident.   
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 357 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Trousers/leggings 
Protection used: not  recorded (worn) 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
Victim "blown limb from limb": immediately fatal. No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the practice of defusing the Pt Mi Baa 111 mines had been identified as dangerous and the 
order to destroy in-situ had been given. It was a management failing that the order was 
delayed in the command chain. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
2 
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any 
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.   
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